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Whatever else may be at issue, there is little doubt that these meetings were important sources of the 'new information' claimed as the basis for the change in perception of recombinant DNA hazards as well as crucial influences on its interpretation.4 As shown later in this paper, the first meeting at Bethesda led directly to a decision to organize the second at Falmouth. And the Falmouth meeting strongly influenced the outcome of the third meeting at Ascot. 5 The results of all of these meetings, particularly the second and third, were subsequently cited repeatedly in scientists' testimony, in policy documents, and in statements of officials in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the National Institutes of Health to justify the claim that there was little cause for concern.6 Largely as a result, attempts to pass legislation aimed at regulating recombinant DNA technology were dropped and the NIH guidelines were revised and substantially weakened. Perhaps most important of all for the course of future policy making, a major change in the principles guiding NIH policy occurred: the burden of proof was transferred from scientists, to show that genetic engineering was safe, to the general public, to show that it was dangerous.7
However, while pressures to move quickly in the recombinant DNA field intensified, the controversy over its hazards continued. It was not a controversy that was easily resolved, largely because of the multidimensional complexity of the issues involved. First, there was an enormous variety of microorganisms which might potentially be used as hosts for cloning purposes and an enormous variety of genes which might be inserted into these organisms. The action and function of many of these genes was not well understood. In addition to these considerations, there was also the question of the interaction of the genetically engineered organism with its environment and with other organisms. In the course of the controversy, dozens of possible risk scenarios were contemplated. A dearth of empirical evidence compounded the uncertainties which emerged in analysis of these possibilities.
Given the complexity of the issues, as well as the fact that the techniques of engineering were evolving rapidly, the debate on the hazards of this field might well have continued indefinitely. In fact, it was soon restricted and ultimately closed down. The general phenomenon of the restriction of scientific controversy has been intensively studied in the last several years, with particular emphasis on intra-scientific mechanisms that produce closure.8 In this essay, I take a different, though complementary, approach to the analysis of scientific controversy, one which has the advantage of suggesting a larger research programme for the analysis of connections between mechanisms of closure and the wider social context. I apply techniques of analysis used previously by political scientists in studies of decision making in political systems, particularly on controversial issues involving conflict and competition between social groups.9 These authors have shown that for an understanding of the dynamics of controversy, it is generally not enough to examine only decisions taken in a formal decision process. Equally, perhaps even more, important for the outcome are such dimensions as the institutional context of decision making and the informal processes that affect the scope of the issues placed on the formal agenda. In this regard, their work suggests several conceptual approaches to the analysis of controversy.
First, these writers have emphasized the importance of examining the institutional environment in which an issue is addressed, as well as the effects of that environment on the distribution of influence in, and access to, the decision arena. In particular, they have proposed that restriction of participation in public affairs should be an object of investigation. As Robert Dahl notes: 'It is a reasonable preliminary hypothesis that the number of individuals who exercise significant control over the alternatives scheduled is... only a tiny fraction of the total membership.' Similarly, E.E. Schattschneider warns against the pluralist assumption that groups compete on equal terms in the policy arena: 'The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. Probably about 90 percent of the people cannot get into the pressure system'.'? In the case of technical controversy, it is no less important to examine how the decision arena is structured and who gains access to it.
A second dimension follows from the first, for restriction of access to the decision arena means that the kinds of issues that are placed on the formal agenda for consideration may also be restricted. The studies noted above emphasize the importance of investigating the tendency for participants in a decision arena to address only those issues and alternatives that do not disrupt the prevailing balance of power. In Schattschneider's words: 'All forms of political organization have a bias in favor-of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out'. ' Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz take a similar position:
Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues that are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of preferences.'2
The same holds for scientific controversy. It is important to ask which aspects of a controversy dominate, and which are neglected, and to investigate the reasons behind these choices.
Finally, the form in which conclusions reached within a decision arena are disseminated can be a powerful means for reinforcing the prevailing bias. Particularly in science, where the full authority of the scientific community can be placed behind a conclusion, dissemination can greatly amplify the effect of the initial decision.
My principal purpose in the following is to use these approaches to show how various institutional, procedural and conceptual characteristics of the conferences at Bethesda, Falmouth, and Ascot acted as 'social filters' for the complex set of perceptions of recombinant DNA hazards with which the scientific community started. I shall argue that as a result, reservations about claims for decreased hazard were for the most part organized out of consideration, whereas claims that certain types of risk were minimal were organized in. Each stage of the process simplified the initial complexity until what was left was virtually a single argument: that whatever else might be done to it, it was impossible to convert E. coli K 12 into an epidemic pathogen which could escape the laboratory and run rampant through a population. (I shall refer to this argument as the 'epidemic pathogen' argument.) I shall discuss here three main mechanisms which were instrumental in this process of social filtration: first, the sponsorship and organization of the meetings, which determined the range of scientific and political participation in them; second, the informal processes that affected the scope of the proceedings and the reporting of results; third, the dissemination of the results and their use to justify weakening social control over the development of recombinant DNA technology.
Sponsorship and Organization
The organization that played a major role in the sponsorship of all of the meetings under consideration was the National Institutes of Health. NIH was the main source of government support for biomedical research in the United States. As such, it was the centre of a vast research network that connected its leadership closely with large research universities on the one hand, and the community of biomedical researchers on the other. As noted above, NIH was also responsible for the development of government controls for possible hazards of recombinant DNA technology. There is abundant evidence to show that university administrators and biomedical researchers overwhelmingly favoured this arrangement. ' As scientific events however, the organization of each of these meetings was anomalous, deviating significantly from the classic norm of openness. Each was unannounced, private, and thus known in advance only to a select group of scientists closely associated with the organization of the event. In each case, the wider scientific community and the public learned of the meetings only after the fact. In the case of the Enteric Bacteria meeting, even the identities of participants other than the two chairmen remain officially unrevealed to this day.14 This does not mean that a range of scientific positions was not represented at these meetings. Participation, however, was definitely controlled. In the first and third meetings, participants were invited by the chairmen. For the Falmouth meeting, a larger organizing committee was responsible for invitations, but even then, only two scientists known to be critical of NIH policy were present. One of those scientists, MIT biologist Jonathan King, later observed that he had to request admission to the meeting from the chairman. King also emphasized that '[the conference] was not announced by the normal procedure for announcing scientific conferences, that is, in the scientific journals, Genetics Society of America, American Society of Microbiology. It was private. It was by invitation of the organizing committee. Many people were rather upset ... to find out that a risk-assessment conference was taking place and they didn't even know about it until after the fact'.15
At the Ascot meeting, held in the United Kingdom, members of the British Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group (GMAG) were not invited -an omission which caused many British eyebrows to be raised. As one member of GMAG later commented:
It might be thought a discourtesy to run an international conference on an important policy question without involving the corresponding organization in the host country, particularly when that is the only one in the world to be setting standards that are used internationally. Indeed, it is hard to see why GMAG should With this orientation to the problem, much of the conference was spent brainstorming the hazards of recombinant DNA technology. A wide and complex collection of issues was brought up, the general tenor of which was that unusual and possibly problematic combinations of genes could gradually be transferred into organisms in the environment where they might at some later time be expressed in a way that could cause eruption of novel disease. As one participant stated: 'there may be problems of low level endemicity. And, depending on what's created, in special cases, serious endemicity. The Botulinus [toxin], the growth-hormone producing E.coli. To me, those are frightening'.20
Consideration of these problems was greatly restricted, however, by the adoption of several assumptions which had the effect of focusing attention on a limited subset of hazards which were generally judged to be of much less concern.
The most important restriction placed on the discussion was the assumption that all recombinant DNA research would be conducted with E. coli K 12, the strain of the common intestinal organism which had been weakened by many years of use in molecular genetic laboratories. As Rowe stated at the beginning of the meeting: Out of the infinite universe of combinations that DNA recombinant research can involve, the guidelines have narrowed it down, it seems to me, to a very advanced level. Of all the bacteria in the universe, we're only really talking about one particular bacteria with options to find parallel ones that are as laboratory restricted. Okay, so E. coli K 12 is really the focus... of these experiments. No other organism is presently considered as 'licensed' under the guidelines.2' Rowe went on to qualify his statement because even in 1976, there was scope in the NIH guidelines for expansion to the use of other organisms in genetic engineering work. Nevertheless, E.coli K12 quickly became the focus of attention.
A second major restriction was the assumption that the assessment would be limited to hazards to communities outside the laboratory. Hazards to workers inside the laboratory were deemed relatively unimportant. In other words, the group took its concern to be not primary exposure but secondary spread. There appears to have been general agreement on this. A third restriction was that recombinant DNA activities would occur only in technologically advanced countries with adequate public health and sewage treatment facilities. The implication was that epidemics in such environments would not occur under any circumstances. As one speaker put it:
This kind of epidemic just doesn't happen and isn't happening in our society largely because of sanitation. We don't have house rats and we don't [have] house fleas and we don't have lice and we don't eat shit and that's what it comes down to. In our kind of society, this kind of epidemic just doesn't happen.23
With these restrictive assumptions, the participants focused their attention on the 'epidemic pathogen' scenario, which was generally agreed to be unlikely. Even so, not all concerns were put to rest. The following exchange is characteristic: -... What I want to know is, living in, say, Washington, can you make an epidemic in Washington? Can you make an organism so virulent that it will make an epidemic in Washington? ..
-I think the point is that your K12 could be carrying a new product that is quiescent as a genetic entity. It's got virulence, but is not expressing itself. As soon as by some accident of nature it then leaves that environment and gets superimposed ... -Can you arrange this accident? Can you think of a circumstance in which you could make it spread? This is really the heart of the issue. Can it be done? -I can't answer that.
Another participant, however, cited the occasional large-scale Salmonella epidemics, such as an outbreak in Riverside, California involving 20,000 people. As someone summarized the concern: 'The point we are trying to make is, if you already have an organism that can cause epidemics and if it receives the genes from, say K12, you can get an epidemic of organisms with those genes'.24
Clearly not everyone was persuaded that the new technology posed no new problems. But as the discussion continued, outstanding issues -such as the question of low-level seepage of novel gene combinations into organisms in the environment -tended to be factored out of consideration rather than confronted. Instead, the sense mentioned earlier that biomedical research was threatened came increasingly into focus. When several people noted that other aspects of biomedical research might pose hazards as serious as those of the new biology, they were warned that scientists must be careful not to stimulate the spread of regulation to other research fields. 'Science,' someone announced, 'is under very serious attack'. 'But where is the attack coming from?' it was asked. 'From ourselves,' came the answer. 'One has to be very careful about the tack one uses and should not say, "Well, gee, we have been doing much more dangerous experiments for years." That's murder! You have to use a very positive approach'.25 In the same vein, someone else (or possibly the same person) warned that:
we have a serious political disease ... [and that] you have to be careful in these arguments that you don't spread it to other people. The big danger about the argument 'But look! something else is much more dangerous than what we do already' is that the 'something else' all of a sudden gets in with a big bag of red tape at the very least.26
Visions of laboratories swathed in red tape dominated the later stages of the morning session. Within the context of concern about the spreading regulation of science, the argument that E. coli could be converted into an epidemic pathogen came to be seen, not simply as one consideration among many others associated with the problem of defining potential recombinant DNA hazards, but as a leading argument and furthermore, an argument which could be developed specifically for the purpose of defusing the growing controversy. As the chairman, Wallace Rowe, expressed this sense:
Why I got you here is that I think if somebody acquires data that convinces important people, they'll say, 'It's a bunch of nonsense; you cannot change E.coli; you've tried, so and so has done this until he is blue in the face and I can't see and a thousand other Infectious Disease people can't see any danger in working with a Salmonella donor into E.coli and a Drosophila into E. coli. The select participants at the Enteric Bacteria meeting, sharing an interest in protecting 'free inquiry' in recombinant DNA research, thus carefully concentrated their attention on developing arguments that would convince the public that research hazards were exaggerated. The issue was not whether the 'epidemic pathogen' argument was technically acceptable but how it should be used politically. As someone summarized the sense of the group at the end of the morning session: The published proceedings show that the Falmouth meeting's response to these questions produced mixed results. Some research appeared to be reassuring although by no means definitive. For example, efforts to establish the K12 strain in the human intestine showed that the organism generally survived no longer than four or five days.3 However, the significance of this result was not altogether clear. Feeding experiments had also demonstrated the failure of other, more robust strains of E. coli to establish themselves.34 Further reassurance was claimed for experiments which showed that efforts to enhance the pathogenicity of the K12 strain by traditional breeding techniques were unsuccessful.35 However, this work was limited in scope, did not use genetic engineering, and was based on limited knowledge of the location and role of genes controlling pathogenic properties of E.coli.36
Other research and analysis was clearly inconclusive. For example, troublesome questions were raised about the capacity ofE. coli K12 to transfer 'foreign' DNA to other more robust organisms which could survive more effectively in the environment.37 As Bruce Levin, a population geneticist who attended the meeting, later described the state of the issue:
There was considerable discussion about the transfer of bacterial plasmids and a general feeling that the rate of infectious transmission in the intestines of healthy mammals would be low. However, in my impression there was absolutely no consensus reached which suggested that the probability of transfer of chimeric DNA by plasmids was sufficiently low to be disregarded. Furthermore, there was very little consideration about transfer via transducing phage or as free DNA. 38 Further questions were raised about the impact of E. coli bacteria which were genetically 'reprogrammed' to make novel proteins. At this point in the development of genetic engineering this possibility was not realized, but it was a major research goal. Jonathan King of MIT and Sydney Brenner of the Cambridge Laboratory for Molecular Biology raised the theoretical possibility that such reprogrammed bacteria might generate new forms of auto-immune disease in which secreted gene products might cause human or animal hosts to make antibodies against their own proteins. 39 Clearly Falmouth did not produce a definitive interpretation of recombinant DNA hazards. Indeed the inconclusiveness of the discussions was underscored by a primary outcome of the meetings: the development of a set of detailed protocols for further risk assessment research. Gorbach, in an introduction to this list of proposals in the published proceedings, stated that 'there must be a beginning, even if it serves to create a focus for disputation; from the cauldron of vigorous scientific debate will finally emerge critical experiments to assess the potential hazards in recombinant DNA In some cases, there was general agreement that the production of hazards was virtually impossible. For example, it was agreed that, because of the differences between the genetic regulatory machinery of bacteria and higher organisms, particularly the inability of bacteria to splice out the recently discovered intervening sequences in animal virus DNA, bacteria carrying whole viral genomes would be unable to make infectious viral particles and so would be unable to provide a new route of viral infection.
Other possibilities were not so easily eliminated, however. For example, if the gene for a viral coat protein were introduced into bacteria, and if the bacteria made this protein, would human hosts exposed to these bacteria become tolerant to the virus and unable to raise an appropriate immunological response? Or, if an entire DNA copy of an RNA virus such as polio were inserted into a bacterium, could the bacterium produce the intact virus, and thus provide a new route of transmission? Or if a gene known to be responsible for tumour formation were inserted into E.coli bacteria and if the bacteria colonized the gut and later died and released this DNA, would this tumourigenic DNA transform exposed cells and cause tumours?
The transcript shows that it was impossible for this group to eliminate such scenarios on theoretical grounds, although the probabilities were generally considered to be low. One participant summarized the conclusions of the group as follows: The tenor of these discussions also shows that at many points, predictions were speculative. Too little was known about the mechanisms of viral infections and transformation to be able to predict the effects of cloning these genes. As one participant remarked:
We do not know that a certain gene product of Marburg or Lassa [virus] is, in fact, highly toxic and is not responsible for the extraordinary ... pathogenicity of this virus. So, if you had one of these genes making a protein product, I am not sure that I would be willing to say today that it should be reduced to P2. I mean, that is something that we simply do not know.46
As another participant summed up the essential problem of making these assessments: You see, the whole discussion has [the feeling of] a sort of Aristotelian academy because we are really just discussing extremely theoretical things and we're deriving models which are based on no experiments whatsoever. I mean, that's why we're talking so much. 47 A further issue that emerged during the meeting was that if the high physical containment levels required by the 1976 NIH controls were lowered, access to the cloning of viruses would be greatly increased, and containment barriers would be more likely to be broken. As one participant stated:
If there's any concern at all in allowing [the genes of higher organisms or animal viruses] to get into the general environment, you can be sure that if these K12 organisms carrying the clones are generally available in all labs, that they will get out, that they will be mobilized into other strains sooner or later.48
As at the earlier meetings, what eventually neutralized concerns such as these was a shift in focus away from hazards to individuals in the laboratory to the issue of secondary spread in communities outside the laboratory. The shaping of the Ascot assessment is most evident in the final day of the meeting when the group drafted a summary statement which purported to represent a consensus. Among other things, the draft referred to the conference's recognition that clones of bacteria carrying certain types of viral DNA might 'bypass the natural barriers to infection by the virus particle, because it is a conceivable, but extremely remote possibility that all the biological containment barriers might break down'.49
This draft was energetically resisted by some who argued that the The trouble with the Ascot meeting was that the moment one raised a scenario, one would be shouted down by [those] saying that the Falmouth meeting had said that the clones were not mobilizable, that they could never get out of E.coli K12 or X1776, and could not become an epidemic strain.52
The final 'consensus' statement which appeared in the Federal Register in March 1978 finessed the issue of hazards to laboratory workers and focused attention on the question of hazards to the community. The latter, the report emphasized, were 'so small as to be of no practical consequence'.53
The overwhelming impression produced by the report on the Ascot conference was one of reassurance. Almost all hazard scenarios were considered 'remote,' 'most unlikely,' or 'impossible'. In general, it was concluded that the cloning of viral DNA would 'pose no more risk than work with the infectious virus or its nucleic acid and in most, if not all cases, clearly present less risk'.54 Since the sole risk assessment experiment designed to test the hazards of cloning viral DNA, the Rowe-Martin polyoma experiment, was a year away from yielding results, these conclusions were surprisingly emphatic. The scientific community's response to earlier fears about the cloning of viral DNA had come to be essentially an attempt to tell the public they had nothing to fear. The dominant image of these meetings, as portrayed in press coverage and in official reports, is one of 'scientific' meetings with 'scientific' agendas. In fact, this analysis has shown that a principal motive for the meetings was the protection of biomedical research from external regulation. At the Enteric Bacteria meeting, the most private of the three, this motive was made quite clear, and numerous comments -with no explicit dissent -suggest that all of the participants accepted it. The same disparity between image and motive characterized the Ascot meeting. It was 'an entirely scientific, analytical process,' Rowe later asserted. However, others at the meeting disagreed. 'It was very obviously a political meeting,' one of the European participants later recalled.
Dissemination of Results

At
The science was not too bad but I had a strong distaste for the way it was managed ... We were being used in the name of being a disinterested group of virologists but it was fairly clear by the end of the meeting that [the organizers] wanted to go back with a result that could be exploited for deregulation.
In the achievement of this consensus, the available scientific data were rarely in question: 'the science was not too bad'. The analysis was politicized at a different level -namely, through the introduction of restrictive assumptions which allowed a selective and reassuring interpretation of these data. The persistent focus on the question of the conversion ofE. coli K 12 into an epidemic pathogen allowed other considerations to be factored out.
It may be argued that the 'scientific consensus' arrived at in the late 1970s has in fact been borne out by the experience of the mid-1980s: a great deal of virtually unregulated cloning has been conducted in laboratories all over the world, in countries without modern sewage systems, and using many bacterial hosts -by no means only the weak E.coli K12. As far as we can tell (and this is a critical qualification because there has been virtually no organized effort to find out) none of this activity has resulted in hazardous biological agents with at least short-term effects.
But the refusal of the scientific establishment in the United States to call for hard experimental evidence that recombinant DNA research would not produce pathogenic substances or organisms, and the alacrity with which biomedical researchers in general rallied round to promote to the public results of brainstorming sessions as 'new evidence', both suggest that the most immediate concern of biomedical researchers at the centre of the cloning controversy in the 1970s was neither public safety nor scientific rigour. In fact, the history of the controversy indicates something entirely different: the insistence of research scientists that their freedom of investigation take precedence over the competing needs of the public and of laboratory workers. 
* NOTES
